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OUR KINDLY PARENT-THE STATE: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND HOW IT WORKS. By Patrick T. Murphy. The
Viking Press, Inc., New York, N.Y., 1974. Pp. x, 180. $8.95.
Working on juvenile cases was like picking up a damp, flat rock
and finding thousands of slimy, crawling things under it.l
In June of 1970, a young Chicago lawyer, Patrick Murphy, became
Chief Counsel of the Juvenile Office of Chicago's Legal Aid Society. For
the next 3 years, he and his small staff wrote a new chapter in the story of
"the rise and fall of the juvenile court."2 They brought a series of lawsuits
exposing, and often putting an end to, the harsh treatment of children
and adolescents confined to reform schools, detention centers, receiving
homes, mental hospitals, facilities for the mentally retarded, and other
institutions of incarceration for Chicago's economically deprived, "dis-
turbed and disturbing"3 youngsters.
Their victories were impressive: the closing of a juvenile prison; a
halt to the banishment of children to out-of-state institutions; reduction
in the incidence of incarceration of runaway children; and a decision
granting hearings to children, who had been taken from their parents,
before the state could commit them to institutions for the mentally ill or
retarded or transfer them from mental health facilities to maximum se-
curity institutions. Court rulings were obtained prohibiting the placement
of juveniles in the state's "security hospital," a maximum security facility
for dangerous, mentally ill adults, and limiting the use of drugs, physical
restraints, solitary confinement, and other excessive forms of discipline.
Private agencies receiving public funds were forced to accept minority
group youngsters from overcrowded, understaffed state facilities; there
was a challenge to the state welfare department's policy of coercing par-
ents in need of social services into confessing that they had "neglected"
their children and giving custody of the children to the state. Finally,
there was a decision from the United States Supreme Court permitting
unwed fathers to contest the removal and commitment to state custody
of their children.4
1. P. MURPHY, OUR KINDLY PARENT-lim STATE: lim JUVENILB JUSTICB SYSTEM
AND How IT WORKS 15 (1974).
2. The expression is taken from E. Ryerson, Between Justice and Compassion:
The Rise and Fall of the Juvenile Court, 1970 (unpublished dissertion in the Yale Law
School Library).
3. This characterization of the children primarily affected by the juvenile justice
system was used by Chief Judge David Bazelon of the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals in an address at the Yale Law School on November 1, 1974.
4. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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Murphy has described his work in a thoughtful and compelling book,
Our Kindly Parent-The State: The Juvenile Justice System and How
It Works. The book is an excellent introduction to the juvenile justice
system for those unfamiliar with its history and practice. It is also a
dramatic account of the efforts of a small group of legal aid lawyers
to reform that system and to rescue children from brutal treatment.
The book should appeal to a wide audience-lawyers, judges, pro-
bation officers, correctional personnel, social workers, behavioral scien-
tists, and, happily, the general reader. Moreover, it is a particularly good
book for law students, describing the day-to-day working life of practic-
ing lawyers attempting to work within the legal system to achieve reform
and justice. The book is laced with excellent descriptions of case devel-
opment and preparation: how issues are presented and disputes resolved
in an adversary system, how tactical and strategic decisions are made,
and how ethical questions arise and are resolved.
Murphy's tone is ironic and bitter,5 yet the story of the efforts of
these lawyers to redress injustice and to relieve suffering both challenges
and inspires. Murphy writes:
Since the inception of the juvenile courts almost a century
ago, a veil of secrecy has surrounded them and their activities. The
alleged reasons for this secrecy is to protect the names and lives of
the children and families who are "aided" by the juvenile justice
system. But. . . the secrecy is perpetuated more to protect those
who work within the state bureaucracies than to maintain the
anonymity of those who are compelled to endure being "saved" by
the system of juvenile justice. This book was written in an at-
attempt to pierce that veil of secrecy and privacy, and to enlighten
the public about how in fact our nation "saves" children and their
parents.6
The Historical Basis 0/ Juvenile Iustice
As Murphy states, the events described in his book must be placed
in historical context. The story actually began in Chicago more than a
century ago. In 1870, 14-year-old Daniel O'Connell was brought before
a superior court judge and charged with being "destitute of proper par-
ental care, and growing up in mendicancy, ignorance, idleness or vice."7
Although the boy had committed no crime, the judge found that he was
5. Some of the chapter titles are indicative of the author's approach: "Care, Cus-
tody, and Maximum Security: Our Battle in the Federal Courts"; "The Demise of
Maximum Security"; "How to Dump Homeless Children in Out-of-the-way-Places";
"The Family-Saving Quagmire."
6. P. MURPHY, supra note 1, at vii-viii.
7. People ex rei. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 lli. 280, 282 (1870).
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"a proper subject for commitment in [the] reform school [and that his]
moral welfare and the good of society require that he should be sent to
said school for instruction, employment and reformation. . . ."8 Dan-
iel was sentenced to the Chicago Reform School pursuant to a statute
which provided that children so described were to be "'kept, disci-
plined, instructed, employed and governed,' until they shall be re-
formed and discharged, or shall have arrived at the age of twenty-one
years."9
Daniel's father obtained the assistance of counsel and brought a
habeas corpus proceeding in the Illinois supreme court seeking Daniel's
release. The court held that the laws under which the boy had been con-
fined were unconstitutional and ordered him set free. "Why," the court
asked, "should children, only guilty of misfortune, be deprived of liberty
without 'due process of law?' "10
If, without crime, without the conviction of any offense, the chil-
dren of the State are to be thus confined for the "good of society,"
then society had better be reduced to its original elements, and free
government acknowledged a failure.ll
While conceding that benevolent and rehabilitative purposes had moti-
vated the statute, the court characterized rehabilitative incarceration as
imprisonment, recognized the social stigma attached to such confine-
ment, and demanded less restrictive alternatives.12 This position would
one day receive general acceptance in our jurisprudence,18 but contem-
poraneous response to O'Connell was to criticize or ignore it. As Mur-
phy observes:
This decision was considered quite illiberal by the child-
and family-rescuers of the day. It obviously hindered them from
saving from their undeserving parents the children growing up in
the immigrant ghettos that were so much a part of the nineteenth-
century American city. What was even worse, the illinois Supreme
Court had looked behind the statute and into the realities of the
8. ld. at 281.
9. ld. at 283.
10. ld. at 287.
11. ld. at 268.
12. It cannot be said, that in this case, there is no imprisonment. Nothing
could more contribute to paralyze the youthful energies, crush all noble aspire-
tions, and unfit him for the duties of manhood. Other means of a milder
character; other influences of a more kindly nature; other laws less in restraint
of liberty, would better accomplish the reformation of the depraved and in-
fringe less upon inalienable rights.
ld. at 287.
13. Even the notion that impoverished children and their parents would one day
have access to free legal counsel in such cases saw its seed planted in 19th-century
Chicago. The first true legal aid society, open to individuals of any nationality, sex, or
age-The Bureau of Justice-was established in Chicago in 1888. JOHNSON, JUSTICE
AND REFORM 5 (1974); R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 136 (1919).
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institutional life and in effect was saying that the disciplille meted
out to O'Connell was, in fact, impvisonment.14
By the turn of the century, O'Connell had been overturned by stat-
ute. The first juvenile court in the United States was established in Chi-
cago in 1899/5 as a result of the efforts of "child savers" of that time such
as Jane Addams, Julia Lathrop, Louise deKoven Bowen, Judge Richard
Tuthill, and Judge Julian Mack.16 As the Supreme Court noted in its
landmark decision, In re Gault: 17
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures
. . . . The child . . . was to be made "to feel that he is the ob-
ject of [the state's] care and solicitude," not that he was under ar-
rest or on trial. The rules of criminal procedure were therefore
altogether inapplicable.. The apparent rigidities, technicalities, and
harshness which they observed in . . . procedural criminal law
were therefore to be discarded.18
Not only were procedural safeguards relaxed, but the jurisdiction
of the juvenile court was far broader than that of adult criminal courts.
Children who, like Daniel O'Connell, had committed no crimes, but
were alleged to be truant, beyond the control of their parents, or other-
wise "in need of supervision," were to join those children who were
charged with adult criminal offenses, in receiving the care, discipline,
and treatment which, the child savers claimed, they had been denied by
their parents.19
Flaws in both the theory and implementation of the reformers'
plans appeared early. Critics such as Wigmore, then teaching in Chica-
go, charged that the system neither rehabilitated offenders nor protected
the community and disregarded the fundamental purposes of the crimi-
nallaw.20 It was not simply that society failed to provide the treatment
resources necessary to fu1fi11 the child savers' promise to reform, edu-
14. P. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 4.
15. See Illinois Juvenile Court Act, Act of Apr. 21, 1899, [1899] Ill. Laws 131.
16. See generally A. PLAIT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
(1969); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1187 (1970); Schultz, The Cycle of Juvenile Court History, 19 CRIME & DELIN. 457
(1973).
17. 387 U.S. ~ (1967).
18. [d. at 15. See generally THE CHrr.D, THE CLINIC AND THE COURT (1. Addams ed.
1925); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REv. 104 (1909).
19. [fhe reformers] were convinced that youth crime was not a problem of
law enforcement but a social-psychological problem of children and their fami-
lies requiring interventions of a therapeutic nature, involving state interference
with and assumption of the parental function of child rearing • . .. The lack
of formal legal procedures and protections for the children was justified on the
ground that nothing "bad" was being done to the children, but rather something
"good" was being provided for them.
Wizner, The Child and the State: Adver.raries in the Juvenile Justice System, 4 CoLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 389, 390 (1972).
20. Wigmore, Juvenile Courts vs. Criminal Courts, 21 ILL. L. REv. 375 (1926).
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cate; and rehabilitate the errant and neglected children of the poor, al-
though that was certainly the case. More fundamentally, the theory was
based upon simplistic, sentimental, and authoritarian notions about
child development, which have been challenged by professionals in
numerous fields.
Shaw and McKay, in their famous Chicago Area Project and other
delinquency studies,21 have shown the extent to which delinquency is a
function of the poverty, overpopulation, and social disorganization of
urban slums. Providing a special court and institutions cannot cure de-
linquency; they can only protect the community from delinquent chil-
dren during the period of their confinement. Psychological theory-
particularly psychoanalysis-has also contradicted the approach of the
child savers. Psychologists have argued that the causes of youthful anti-
social behavior are deeply rooted within the personality and, therefore,
cannot be treated effectively except through extended individual psy-
chotherapy.22 If the sociologists and psycholgists are correct, the super-
ficial efforts of friendly probation officers, kindly judges, and humane
correctional personnel are doomed to failure from the outset. Similarly,
legal theorists and criminologists have joined in criticizing the theoreti-
cal assumptions of the child savers. Professor Francis Allen, formerly of
the University of Chicago Law School, has correctly pointed out the in-
herent conflict in the juvenile justice system between legal values and
rehabilitative ideal.
We shall escape much confusion here if we are willing to give
candid recognition to the fact that the business of the juvenile court
inevitably consists, to a considerable degree, in dispensing punish-
ment. . ., [W]e can no more avoid the problem of unjust punish-
ment in the juvenile court than in the criminal court. . .. A
child brought before a tribunal . • . has . . . a right to receive
not only the benevolent concern of the tribunal but justice. One
may question with reason the value of therapy purchased at the
expense of justice.23
Revisionist historians of the child-saving movement have begun to
question even the motivations of the reformers who had devised and
promoted the special juvenile justice system. Platt24 and Fox21l have con-
21. C. SHAW, TIm JACK-ROLLER, A DELINQUENT Boy's OWN STORY (1930); C.
SHAw, TIm NATURAL HISTORY OF A DELINQUENT CAREER (1931); C. SHAW & H. Mc-
KAY, DELINQUENCY AND URBAN AREAs (1942, 1969); C. SHAw & H. McKAy, DELIN-
QUENCY AREAS (1929); C. SHAW, H. McKAY, B. HANSON, E. BURGESS & J. McDONALD,
BROTHERS IN CRIME (1938).
22. See Ryerson, supra note 2, at 128-68.
23. F. ALLEN, TIm BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18-19 (1964).
24. A. PLATT, supra note 16.
25. Fox, supra note 16.
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tended that middle-class and conservative interests dominated the
child-saving movement, and that the movement was in fact a paternalis-
tic and class-motivated effort to control the lives of urban lower-class
adolescents by imposing sanctions upon premature independence and
behavior deemed unbecoming to youth. The leaders of the movement,
particularly those involved with settlement houses serving immigrant
populations, were prominent, often wealthy, women who advocated
therapeutic strategies to achieve social control and sought to impose
middle class values on the children of the poor, while creating a respect-
able professional identity for themselves. These reformers promoted
correctional programs requiring longer terms of imprisonment for chil-
dren than for adults, frequently for reasons which would not justify the
incarceration of an adult, consisting of long hours of physical labor,
militaristic discipline, and "the inculcation of middle-class values and
lower-class SkillS."26
Thus, by exposing the abuses perpetrated by the juvenile justice
system in Chicago and challenging its theoretical basis, Patrick Murphy
has joined the ranks of a distinguished group of social scientists, crimi-
nologists, lawyers, and historians who represent a Chicago-centered
tradition of child advocacy and juvenile justice criticism.
The Lawyer's Role in Juvenile Justice Reform
Most importantly, the Murphy book raises the question of the
proper role of the lawyer in the juvenile justice system.27 Murphy reports
that when he and his associates began to bring lawsuits challenging some
of the practices of state agencies and juvenile justice officials, "the shock
waves in and around the juvenile bureaucracies were unbelievable.
Everybody-from lawyers in the public defender's and state's attorney's
offices, to the social workers in the juvenile agency-looked upon us as
ogres for challenging such a benign system."28
This response is difficult to comprehend when one reads Murphy's
descriptions of children tied, spread-eagled, to beds in mental hospitals
for weeks at a time, thrown into solitary confinement "strip cells" for
long periods, and kept close to unconsciousness by large doses of
powerful tranquilizing drugs; of mentally competent children com-
mitted to mental hospitals or dumped in institutions for the retarded;
26. A. PLATT, supra note 16, at 26.
27. See generally W. STAPLETON & L. TErrELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A
STUDY OF THE ROLE OF CoUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENll.E CoURTS (1972); Weiss, De-
fense of a Juvenile Court Case, in 3 CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES 60.01[IJ (S.
Bernstein ed. 1974); Wizner, supra note 19. See also J. GoLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
SoLNrr, BEYOND THE BEST 1NTEREsTs OF THE CHILD, ch. 5 (1973).
28. P. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 12.
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of runaway children incarcerated in jails; of a 13-year-old child receiv~
ing an unconsented to and unnecessary hysterectomy; of thousands of
children neglected and mistreated by the state in the name of child sav~
ing. As Murphy wrote: "In our work, we had been in many jails, hos~
pitals, and detention centers . . .. I could never walk away without
a feeling of severe depression at the thought of what some humans
would do to others in the name of 'help.' "29
Ordinary bureaucratic defensiveness may account, to some degree,
for the reactions of public officials to the legal challenges brought by
Murphy's office, but a more complex explanation is required for the
systematic retreat from reality by those public officials responsible for
maintaining children in such unconscionable circumstances. This ex~
planation may be that the juvenile justice system is a world where euphe-
mistic labels and unrealistic pretensions substitute for reality. It is a
world where an indictment is a petition; a prosecutor is a court advocate;
a guilty verdict is a finding; a sentence is a disposition; a jail is a detention
center; a prison is a training school; a cell is a room; and a strip cell used
for solitary confinement is a reintegration or intensive treatment unit. It
is a fantastic world where labels are applied to children virtually inter-
changeably in order to conform the children to whatever programs or
placements are in fact available at a given time. When a lawyer, from
outside the system, like Murphy, questions such manipulation of labels
and looks behind the terminology of the juvenile justice professionals, he
is threatening the world to which they have become accustomed. Rather
than join with him to alleviate suffering and redress injustice, they fight
back.
When Murphy brought a successful suit seeking the release of "ne-
glected" children from the detention center Gail), the number of
"neglected" children incarcerated fell dramatically. Strangely, how-
ever, the number of "minors in need of supervision" confined in the
same detention center increased substantially, as did the number of
"mentally ill" and "retarded" children confined to mental hospitals and
mstitutions for the retarded.30 They were the same children; only their
labels had been changed. "The fact was, whenever we put pressure
on one juncture in the dumping process, the population in the other
juncture would increase."31
29. P. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 139.
30. In most states children who are not in need of psychiatric care can be confined
to mental hospitals as "voluntary" patients by their parents or legal guardians, whether
or not the child agrees to be so committed and without a hearing or any other form ofjudicial scrutiny. Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental Commitment of Minors to
Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840 (1974).
31. P. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 119.
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In view of the inadequate resources available to the state, the result-
ing dumping and neglect of children in state custody, and the substantial
deprivations of liberty involved, the juvenile justice system must become
an adversary one. In every realistic respect. it is an adversary system, and
any effort to deny that fact is simply another attempt to camouflage reali-
ty by manipulating labels.
By exposing the adversary quality of the juvenile' justice system,
Murphy demonstrates that the proper role for the child's lawyer is the
same as the role of a lawyer representing any other client in any adver-
sary process.32 Even if children are subject to parental or state control,
even if they are not fully competent to make intelligent decisions con-
cerning their own best interests, and even if children are more amenable
to treatment and rehabilitation than adults,33 this hardly justifies a con-
clusion that they are not entitled to due process of law. Those adults
seeking their institutionalization must be required to demonstrate that it
is in fact necessary, proper, and the best program for them, involving the
least restriction of their liberty.
Nevertheless, Murphy has no illusions that lawyers can "save" chil-
dren any better than social workers or bureaucrats: "The litigation
helped some of our clients and gave them hope for a brighter future. But
for others, although the cases we brought on their behalf may have
wrought major changes in the law, they themselves were unaffected and
continued on their downward slide to poverty and crime."34 Nor does
Murphy believe that juvenile courts should be abolished:
We do need a juvenile court to prosecute youngsters charged
with serious criminal offenses, to assist in resolving the problems
of adolescents who can no longer live at home, and to review
charges of serious physical or emotional child-abuse. But cases
in which the courts are merely used as a club to enforce the views
of middle-class social workers and inept regulations should be no
part of a judicial system . . .. The juvenile court too often acts
32. "The constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can
only be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his
client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae." Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967). I have benefited greatly from conversations with and written work by Steven
Goode, Yale Law School class of 1975, concerning the role of counsel in civil commit-
ment proceedings. Mr. Goode's views, and my own, appear to be somewhat inconsistent
with the. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7, EC 7-11, 7-12 (1971).
However, as Mr. Goode has demonstrated in a Note in the Yale Law Journal, these
provisions are so ambiguous that they could be construed to be consistent with these
views. Note, The Role of ·Counsel in the Civil Commitment Process: A Theoretical
Framework, 84 YALE L.J. 1540 (1975).
33. This is a doubtful proposition. Martinson, "What Works?-Questions and An-
swers About Prison Reform," PUBLIC INTEREST, Spring 1974, at 22, 25-27.
34. P. MURPHY supra note 1, at 164.
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as a rubber stamp, giving its imprimatur to the switching of chil-
dren and families from agency to agency.35
Rather, Murphy argues for the development of what the Cahns
have called a "civilian perspective"86 as a means of reforming the public
child welfare system:
Citizens who are supposed to be assisted by the state must
have some form of power over it. Many of the inequities caused
to our clients were the result of irrational decisions made by lower-
level state bureaucrats and stupidly upheld by their superiors. Of
course, we had many of these decisions reversed, but only after
expensive and time-consuming litigation. And we only repre-
sented a few of the people who had been kicked around . . . .
,[W]e seem to have reached a stage now where the bureaucracies
run themselves without regard to political or public pressure of
> any sort.31
An essential component of the civilian perspective is the provision of
competent legal counsel in sufficient numbers to challenge the decisions
of the child-saving bureaucrats. But even more important is legislative
reform reducing the power of the bureaucracies and of the juvenile court
over citizens. One can only hope that the work of legislative reformers
Will be guided by the words of the Illinois supreme court, more than a
century ago, in the O'Connell case:
In our solicitude to form youth for the duties of civi1life, we should
not forget the rights which inhere both in parents and children.
The principle of the absorption of the child in, and its complete
subjection to the despotism of, the State, is wholly inadmissible in
the modem civilized world.38
Stephen Wizner*
3S. Id. at 174.
36. Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE LJ. 1317
(1964); Cahn & Cahn, What Price Justice: The Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41
NOTRE DAME LAw. 927 (1966).
37. P. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 177.
38. People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, SSllI. 280, 284 (1870).
* Supervising Attorney and Lecturer-in-Law, Yale Law School. A.B. 19S9, Dart-
mouth College; J.D. 1963, University of Chicago.
